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ABSTRACT 
 
As a subcategory of contract negotiations, corporate transactions present 
information problems that have not been fully analyzed. In particular, the 
literature does not address the possibility that parties may simply be unaware 
of value-increasing transaction terms or their outside option. Such 
unawareness can arise even for transactions that attract many competing 
parties, if the bargaining process is such that (1) the price terms are negotiated 
and fixed prior to the non-price terms, contrary to the standard assumption; 
and (2) some of the non-price terms remain private for some period of time. 
A simple bargaining model shows that, when such unawareness is 
reasonably probable, each transaction party will maximize its expected payoff 
by acquiring current market information about non-price transaction terms. 
Because they have unique access to it, law firms with a significant share of 
transactional advisory work play an important role in aggregating and selling 
such market information. The implication is that, absent shocks to 
transactional practice, the volume advantage of high-market-share law firms 
should be self-perpetuating. This result is consistent with the observation that 
the legal advisory market for major corporate transactions is highly 
concentrated, and that the top firms earn substantial and persistent rents. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Major corporate transactions such as mergers and acquisitions or 
financings are characterized by several salient facts that lack a complete 
theoretical account. First, they are almost universally negotiated at least in part 
through agents. Transactional lawyers do not simply translate the parties’ 
bargain into legally enforceable language; rather, they are actively involved in 
proposing and bargaining over the transaction terms (Coates, 2001). Second, 
such transactions are negotiated in stages, often with the price terms set first 
by the parties, followed by negotiations primarily among lawyers over the non-
price terms (Choi and Triantis, 2012, p. 1690). Third, while the transaction 
terms tend to be tailored to the individual parties, in negotiations the parties 
frequently resort to claims that specific terms are (or are not) “market” (Choi 
and Triantis, 2013). Fourth, the legal advisory market for such transactions is 
highly concentrated, with a half-dozen firms holding a majority of the market 
share (de Fontenay, 2015, p. 402-403).  
This paper provides a theoretical account of negotiations over corporate 
transactions consistent with these facts, centered on specific information 
problems faced by the parties.  The claim is that, for complex transactions 
experiencing either sustained innovation in terms or rapidly changing market 
conditions, (1) the parties will maximize their expected surplus by investing in 
market information about transaction terms, even under relatively competitive 
conditions, and (2) such market information can effectively be purchased by 
hiring law firms that hold a significant market share for a particular type of 
transaction. 
The considerable complexity of corporate transaction terms creates an 
information problem that, to the author’s knowledge, has not been addressed 
in the law or finance literatures: one or both parties may simply be unaware of 
the complete set of surplus-increasing terms for the transaction and of their 
respective outside options, should negotiations break down. This problem is 
distinct from the commonly treated problem of valuation uncertainty. Rather 
than unawareness of facts that may affect the value of the capital asset to be 
transferred between the parties, the problem identified here is unawareness of 
the possibilities for contracting with respect to that asset. The difference can be 
illustrated using the well-worn example of a used-car sale.  The buyer may be 
uncertain as to the value of the car itself, given unawareness of certain facts 
such as whether it was well maintained by the seller. This source of valuation 
uncertainty can be mitigated in part by a seller-provided warranty. A different 
problem is presented, however, if the parties are entirely unaware of the 
concept of a warranty.  
Though unrealistic in the context of used-car sales, both unawareness of 
value-increasing terms and uncertainty over outside options are not only 
plausible, but likely for certain corporate transactions. The non-price terms of 
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transactional agreements and their associated payoffs may change rapidly as a 
result of contractual innovation and market conditions (Choi and Triantis, 
2013), such that parties without current market information may have 
difficulty determining their expected surplus from transacting. This is 
particularly so for corporate transactions involving private companies or 
private securities offerings that are not otherwise subject to public disclosure 
requirements, because the transaction terms will remain private for at least 
some period of time. In such cases, law firms with a high market share of that 
particular advisory work are likely to have the best real-time access to the full 
range of transaction terms, given their role in negotiations and control of the 
transaction agreements. 
This unawareness problem can exist even for transactions in which large 
numbers of participants compete to be matched. This is because many 
corporate transactions are negotiated in the reverse order from that assumed 
by standard bargaining models. In such transactions—which include most 
mergers and acquisitions and loan financings—the price term is set first in a 
process (such as an auction) that is at least potentially open to many 
participants. Once the party offering the best price at this stage has been 
identified and selected, the matched counterparties proceed to negotiate the 
bulk of the non-price terms on a bilateral basis, typically with their respective 
lawyers taking the lead (Manns and Anderson, 2013, p. 1176; Choi and 
Triantis, 2012, p. 1690-91). Although the price term is set in the first stage with 
some expectation as to what the final non-price terms will be, the latter are not 
fully specified ex ante, due to the transaction costs and delay involved with 
negotiating hundreds of complex transaction terms with every potential 
bidder.  As a result, a party lacking complete information about non-price 
transaction terms cannot count on being offered the “market” terms purely 
through competition among its potential counterparties.  
The parties to such transactions are therefore in a strategic game: they 
must decide whether to invest in acquiring market information about 
transaction terms and how much of this information to reveal to their 
counterparty. The bilateral bargaining model herein shows that, under 
plausible assumptions, there is a unique Nash equilibrium to the parties’ game 
in which both sides will engage an “informed” law firm to advise them on the 
transaction. This joint investment in market information ensures that the 
parties will get the benefit of all value-increasing transaction terms, while 
avoiding costly signals to an uninformed counterparty.  
The implication is that aggregating and selling market information can be 
important roles for law firms with leading transactional practices, as 
distinguished from their traditional roles as reputational intermediaries, 
regulatory experts, and draftsmen. Such law firms should therefore have a self-
perpetuating volume advantage for transactions in which a material share of 
the information about transaction terms is private. The paper thus contributes 
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to the literature on the role of lawyers in corporate transactions (Coates, 2001; 
Gilson, 1984; Kraakman, 1986; Schwarcz, 2007; Ribstein, 2010, Krishnan and 
Masulis, 2013). Finally, the paper has broad implications for contract theory. 
The dominant view is that the non-price terms of voluntary bargains will tend 
to be efficient—that is, they will be surplus-maximizing for the parties taken 
collectively (Priest, 1981; Schwartz, 1977). The paper shows that institutional 
differences in how transactional agreements are negotiated can lead the parties 
to deviate from the efficient set of terms, simply by being unaware of the 
surplus-maximizing set, for example. Moreover, because transactional lawyers 
typically drive negotiations over the non-price terms, they ultimately play a far 
greater role in valuing transaction terms than is commonly understood. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on information problems in 
corporate transactions and introduces the problem of unawareness of the 
scope and pricing of transaction terms. Section 3 explains law firms’ role in 
aggregating current market information about transaction terms and the 
conditions under which market information may be valuable for transactional 
bargaining.  Section 4 presents a game-theory model of law firm selection in 
transactional bargaining. For transactions involving a reasonable probability of 
unawareness, the parties are incentivized to select law firms with market 
information.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 
 
Negotiations over the terms of major corporate transactions such as 
mergers and acquisitions or financings are an instance of bargaining under 
incomplete and asymmetric information.  First, if we define such transactions 
simply as transfers of capital assets (Gilson, 1984), the parties are likely to face 
uncertainty about the value of that asset, and relevant information is likely to 
be asymmetrically distributed between them (ibid.). In negotiating the sale of a 
company, for example, the seller should have better information than the 
buyer as to the company’s value. Similarly, in the case of financing 
transactions, investors know less than management about the firm’s quality 
and management’s potential for moral hazard.  
Corporate lawyers play an important role in mitigating such informational 
asymmetries in valuation. First, they draft contract terms that allow for 
signaling and screening (ibid.). Terms such as earnouts and indemnification 
provisions shift some of the valuation risk to the more informed party. 
Representations and warranties serve not only as a risk-shifting device, but also 
as a means of inducing the more informed party to disclose information 
relevant to valuation. In financing contracts, the various covenants agreed to 
by the borrower also serve to limit moral hazard (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
This contractual approach to mitigating information asymmetry has been 
referred to as “transaction cost engineering” (Gilson, 1984).  Second, law firms 
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can mitigate information asymmetry over valuation by acting as reputational 
intermediaries (Kraakman, 1986; Okamoto, 1995). Being represented by a 
well-established law firm could signal some level of quality to the market, 
based on the law firm’s reputation for due diligence, for example, or the 
private information that it has acquired over the course of its longstanding 
representation of the company.1  
Yet the information problems faced by the parties are not limited to 
uncertainty over the value of the capital asset to be transferred between them. 
The agreements governing such transfers are highly complex, generally 
comprising hundreds of substantive terms, many of which are heavily 
negotiated among the counterparties (Coates, 2001). This complexity appears 
to be primarily driven by three factors, among many others. First, as discussed, 
firm valuation is notoriously uncertain, and the parties use an array of 
transaction terms to transfer valuation risk between them. Second, corporate 
transactions and corporate operations may be subject to complex regulation 
affecting both value and process in corporate transactions, which in turn is 
reflected in transaction agreements (Schwarcz, 2007; Fleischer, 2010). Third, 
corporate transactions do not occur all at once. They unfold in several stages 
(such as signing, closing, and the post-closing indemnification period), and 
they often establish an ongoing relationship between the parties (such as with 
credit facilities), adding risk and uncertainty for the parties.  
This complexity of corporate transaction terms creates additional 
information problems for the parties. To maximize their joint surplus, the 
parties must successfully identify the complete set of value-increasing terms 
for the transaction at issue. The parties thus require information not only 
about the value of the capital asset at issue, but also about the myriad 
possibilities for contracting with regards to that asset, and the latter may be 
difficult to obtain. Specifically, one or both parties (1) may be unaware of the 
existence of terms that would be value-increasing and (2) may lack information 
as to the value of their respective outside options, should negotiations break 
down.   
Consider each of these in turn. Unawareness of value-increasing terms can 
occur most obviously if new terms are frequently being devised for a particular 
type of transaction, but remain private for at least some period of time.  While 
many transaction terms become standardized over time (Choi and Gulati, 
2006; Kahan and Klausner, 1997), it is also the case that new terms do arise, 
and specific transaction types in specific periods have experienced high rates 
of contractual innovation (de Fontenay, 2015). Financial innovation, regulatory 
change, technological change, and changes in market conditions can all prompt 
contractual innovation. Because such innovations may not become public 
                                                 
1 The signal (if any) provided by law-firm reputation is likely to be considerably weaker 
today than during eras in which clients commonly maintained long-term relationships with a 
single law firm (Gilson, 1991). 
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knowledge for some time (as discussed below), transaction parties that are not 
high-volume players are likely to remain unaware in the meantime.2  
Second, parties may lack sufficient information to determine the expected 
payoffs from various transaction terms or the overall value of their outside 
option. This is so even in the absence of any innovation in transaction terms, 
because payoffs can vary based on market conditions, regulatory changes, or 
the specific characteristics of the parties.  Imagine, for example, a buyer that 
intends to rely heavily on debt-financing to acquire another company. As the 
parties negotiate the acquisition agreement, the value of the buyer’s right to 
terminate the agreement if it fails to obtain financing will depend largely on the 
condition of the credit markets between signing and closing.   
In sum, the set of surplus-maximizing terms for a particular transaction 
and their associated payoffs can vary considerably over time and for different 
parties. Section 3 explains why information about transaction terms can 
increase a party’s payoff in expectation and where such information can be 
obtained. 
 
3.  MARKET INFORMATION: WHERE TO GET IT AND WHY 
 
We refer here to current information about the terms of a particular type 
of corporate transaction as “market information.”  At a minimum, it consists 
of real-time knowledge of the complete set of final terms of recent comparable 
transactions—effectively, a database of transaction documents for the most 
recently completed deals. At its best, it further includes experience with 
negotiating such terms, sufficient to enable a rough estimation of the expected 
payoffs of such terms to similar parties and their pricing under current market 
conditions.3 
As we have seen, for certain transactions market information may be 
private for at least some period of time. It is therefore at least partially 
excludable.  But does it necessarily have value?  In a relatively competitive 
market, we would assume that, regardless of a party’s knowledge of the 
transaction terms obtained by others, it would be offered the “market” terms 
in equilibrium. This need not be the case, however.  Many types of corporate 
transactions are negotiated in such a way that the parties’ information about 
                                                 
2 Unawareness was first formalized in economic theory by Fagin and Halpern (1988). 
General models for strategic interaction with unawareness and their solution concepts are 
found in Feinberg (2004), Li (2006), Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006, 2008), Grant and 
Quiggin (2009), and Halpern and Rego (2006), among others. Feinberg (2012) proves the 
existence of the extended Nash equilibrium solution for dynamic games with unawareness, 
defined as games involving players with different and limited perceptions of the game. 
3 In practice, rather than being able to assign specific dollar values to various transaction 
terms, transactional lawyers are likely to develop an intuitive sense of the relative value of 
different transaction terms to the parties. Their role in negotiations is thus to ensure that the 
client trades off terms of equivalent value. 
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the market and expected payoffs from individual terms should affect both the 
amount of surplus from the transaction and its distribution between the 
counterparties.  
The principal reason is that, as discussed, transactions such as mergers and 
acquisitions and loan financings are negotiated in stages.  In the first stage, the 
price terms and a subset of key non-price terms are agreed upon by the 
principals and often captured in the form of a term sheet, letter of intent or 
commitment letter. In the second stage, the remainder of the non-price terms 
are negotiated bilaterally, primarily between the parties’ legal counsel. While 
the price terms agreed to in the first stage tend to be public knowledge, for 
certain types of transactions some or all of the non-price terms agreed to in 
later stages can remain private for an extended period of time, as we have seen.  
Importantly, the price terms agreed to in the first stage—which typically 
become public knowledge—are sticky, regardless of the bargain reached in the 
later stages with respect to the remaining terms (Manns and Anderson, 2013, 
p. 1176; Choi and Triantis, 2012, p. 1690-91).  In other words, notwithstanding 
that the parties’ agreement with respect to the price terms is rarely, if ever, 
legally binding, the parties are highly unlikely to modify the public price terms 
once they have been fixed.  
This form of negotiation represents a puzzle for the traditional law and 
economics literature, which assumes that the price term is set last, such that 
any horse-trading over non-price terms is simply reflected in a corresponding 
adjustment to the price term.  Why indeed would the parties risk breaking off 
negotiations entirely over disagreements with respect to the non-price terms, 
rather than simply adjust the price term?  The explanation appears to turn on 
ex ante efficiency considerations in the negotiation process and repeat-player 
reputational dynamics, which combine to create a strong norm against 
renegotiating the price term.  Negotiating the non-price terms of a transaction 
is a complex, time-consuming affair.  The investment in time and money is 
unlikely to be recouped unless the parties are relatively confident that they 
have a deal.  Thus, the business teams will begin by agreeing to the price terms 
and a subset of non-price terms, subject to a non-binding understanding that, 
in the later stages of negotiations, the remaining non-price terms will be in the 
range of the appropriate “market” terms, adjusted for the particularities of the 
transaction and the counterparties at issue.  
This two-stage approach is particularly justified when the counterparties to 
the deal have not been predetermined.  For example, a company putting itself 
up for sale will often run an auction with multiple bidders, in order to achieve 
the highest price in the shortest amount of time.  In most cases, negotiating a 
complete and binding merger agreement with each of the potential bidders 
would involve excessive transaction costs and delay. Instead, then, the auction 
can be limited to the price term(s) and a key subset of non-price terms, leaving 
the remainder of the terms to be negotiated by counsel once the winning 
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bidder has been selected. Thus, while multiple bidders compete to offer the 
best price term, negotiations over the bulk of the non-price terms occur 
exclusively between two parties.   
In this two-stage approach, it is therefore crucial to have current 
information about the market non-price terms, since the latter will not simply 
be offered by bidders competing against one another.  Intuitively, then, if the 
parties can invest in market information and the cost is less than the expected 
benefit, they will do so. Section 4 provides a theoretical demonstration of this 
intuition. As we shall see, the information game in this case is strategic, given 
that each party’s expected payoff from the transaction will depend also on the 
counterparty’s information. 
A ready solution is simply to engage one of the law firms that holds a 
significant share of the advisory market for the type of transaction at issue. 
Not only do such firms have access to the final transaction agreements for 
recent deals, they have acquired additional private information about the 
relative payoffs and pricing of transaction terms by haggling over them.4 While 
other market participants such as investment banks also acquire market 
information about transaction terms, law firms should have the most complete 
information about non-price terms, due to their role in all stages of 
negotiations and their control of the transaction documents.  
 
4.  MODEL OF LAW FIRM SELECTION 
 
A.  Bargaining Framework. 
 
The parties, described generally as “borrower” and “lender,” are to 
negotiate the terms of a private transaction (the “loan”).  The price terms of 
such loans are common knowledge, while the non-price terms are private 
information. Prior to the negotiations, each party must decide whether to 
engage—at higher cost—a law firm that is informed of the market terms for 
such loans.   
The set of transaction terms to be negotiated consists of: 
(1) a price term p (such as the interest rate and fees on a loan);  
(2) discrete non-price terms; and  
(3) for convenience, a continuous term t that both parties value 
comparably. 
The continuous term t is equivalent to a straight transfer between the parties.5 
A positive (negative) value of t represents a transfer from the borrower 
(lender) to the lender (borrower).  We assume that the value of t in earlier 
                                                 
4 This haggling may also take place in post-closing litigation handled by the same firm, in 
which the parties fight over the value of terms in settlement discussions. 
5 In practice such a continuous variable may not exist, but could be approximated by 
aggregating several different terms with small costs and benefits. 
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periods was negotiated to be t = 0—it is set to zero without loss of 
generality—and that this is common knowledge. 
Assume that there exists a discrete term d that is not yet common 
knowledge.  For a borrower of this type, d would benefit the borrower at the 
lender’s expense, but is value-increasing overall: that is, if included in the 
transaction agreement, the discrete term would increase the borrower’s expected 
payoff by an amount ࢞ ൐ 0 and decrease the lender’s expected payoff by an 
amount ࢟ ൐ 0, but with ݔ െ ݕ ൐ 0.  Assume that both parties can fully 
calculate the expected benefits and costs of this discrete term once they are 
made aware of it.6 
The transaction negotiations occur in three stages, reflecting the practice 
for certain corporate transactions of settling on the price terms before 
negotiating the non-price terms: 
 
 
 
Stage 0:  Each party simultaneously chooses whether to hire an “informed” 
law firm (defined below) or an “uninformed” law firm.  Because of reputation 
effects in these markets, it is common knowledge which law firms are 
informed, such that each party will know whether the other is informed when 
they begin negotiating non-price terms in Stage 2. Informed law firms are 
more expensive, represented here by an additional fixed cost ε > 0; therefore, 
they will not be used unless there is an expected benefit to the client.   
 
Stage 1:  Lenders compete in an auction to offer the borrower the lowest 
price term.  The price that lenders are willing to offer reflects what they expect 
to negotiate as non-price terms in Stage 2.  Because the price term is publicly 
observable for these loans, all parties are aware of what the likely price term is 
for a borrower with these characteristics.  The borrower selects the lender 
offering the lowest price term.  Once the winning lender has been selected, per 
                                                 
6 As discussed above, in practice the parties may also be uncertain as to their expected 
payoff from the discrete term, particularly if it is a relatively novel term.  An informed law 
firm’s market information should mitigate this source of uncertainty as well, though this is not 
modeled here. 
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market practice the agreed-upon price term may not be changed during 
subsequent negotiations.   
 
Stage 2:  The parties negotiate the remaining transaction terms.  The 
negotiation is limited to (i) deciding whether to include the discrete term d in 
the transaction agreement (if at least one party is aware of it) and (ii) setting the 
transfer payment t.  Negotiations proceed according to the alternating-offers 
protocol outlined by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). After any 
offer is rejected, there is a very small chance ሺ1 െ ࢾሻ that the negotiation will 
exogenously break down (that is, 0 ൏ ߜ ൏ 1 and ߜ is very close to 1).  In that 
event, both parties incur a lump-sum loss L and return to the market.7  (In 
practice, L might represent breach of contract damages, pre-negotiated 
termination fees, or the transaction costs associated with beginning the process 
all over again with another party.)  In this type of game, the parties negotiate 
over a split of the surplus, defined as the total payoff to agreement minus the 
payoff from the parties’ outside options (Sutton, 1986).  Assuming here no 
difference in negotiating skill between informed and uninformed law firms, the 
equilibrium outcome of the negotiation is that the parties will simply split the 
surplus equally (ibid.). 
 
Consistent with reports by practitioners, we posit that, over time, the non-
price terms of a transaction agreement can temporarily shift in favor of one or 
the other party.8 Without loss of generality, we initially consider the case in 
which the non-price terms have shifted in favor of borrowers in the form of 
the discrete term d.  In other words, if both parties were fully informed, the 
most likely set of loan terms to be offered a borrower with these specific 
characteristics by any lender (the “market” terms) would be (1) a price term of 
p, (2) the discrete term d, and (3) no transfer payment (t = 0).  This set of 
terms is referred to as the “Borrower-Friendly” loan agreement. 
By contrast, if both parties are uninformed (and therefore unaware of both 
the discrete term d and the market shift in borrowers’ favor), they expect that 
borrowers of this type are being offered loan agreements with (1) a price term 
                                                 
7 For simplicity, both parties incur the same loss L here, but the model’s results hold if the 
parties incur different loss amounts. 
8 Choi and Triantis (2013) show that where, as here, the price term is set first in multi-
stage negotiations, the parties’ relative bargaining power can affect the non-price terms to 
which they will agree. (The model herein assumes equal bargaining power.)  Yet multi-stage 
negotiations could also lead to temporary market-wide shifts in non-price terms in favor of 
one side of a transaction. When signs of a major credit crunch first manifested in the summer 
of 2007, for example, the largest U.S. banks had already committed to provide billions of 
dollars in financing for new leveraged buyout transactions at historically low interest rates.  
Because the borrower-favorable “price term” had previously been fixed, the shift in market 
conditions—the tightening of credit—resulted in lender-favorable non-price terms market-
wide when the loan terms were eventually negotiated. 
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of p, (2) no additional discrete terms, and (3) no transfer payment (t=0).  We 
define ࣊࢈ and ࣊࢒ as the payoffs to the borrower and the lender, respectively, 
under this “Neutral” loan agreement.   
An “informed” law firm is thus both (1) aware of the discrete term d and its 
associated payoffs for the parties and (2) aware that the parties’ outside option 
is currently the Borrower-Friendly loan agreement.  By contrast, an “uninformed” 
law firm (1) is not aware of the discrete term d and (2) mistakenly believes that 
the parties’ outside option is the Neutral loan agreement. 
 
The outcomes at Stage 1 and 2 generate the payoffs for the following 
choices at Stage 0: 
 
Fig. 1.  Stage 0: Selection of Law Firms. 
 
 
 
We show below that State D is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game: 
both parties benefit in Stage 2 from being represented by an informed law 
firm.  By implication, as long as ε is small enough, both parties will hire 
informed law firms at Stage 0.   
 
B.  Proof. 
 
Suppose that all lenders offer a price term near p at Stage 1.  The borrower 
selects one such lender and we now consider outcomes at Stage 2, in which the 
non-price terms are negotiated bilaterally.9  
 
1. State A:  Both parties uninformed.  
 
Because neither party’s law firm is informed in State A, both parties are 
unaware of the discrete term d; thus it does not feature in the negotiation.  
                                                 
9 Because the additional cost of using an informed law firm is modeled here as a lump 
sum, it is sunk at Stage 2 and need not be considered. 
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Instead, they negotiate over the level of the continuous term, t. Recall that 
their final payoffs will be ሺߨ௕ െ ݐሻ and ሺߨ௟ ൅ ݐሻ, respectively, and t may be 
negative. What value of t is agreed upon in equilibrium?  The parties expect 
that in every other negotiation, parties are agreeing to the Neutral terms (no 
additional discrete terms and t=0), which provide payoffs to the borrower and 
lender of ߨ௕ and ߨ௟ respectively. And they value their outside options at 
ሺߨ௕ െ ܮሻ and ሺߨ௟ െ ܮሻ, respectively, where L is the lump-sum loss incurred in 
the event the negotiations break down. The negotiated value of t is determined 
by the parties’ splitting the surplus equally:   
 
Borrower's surplus = Lender's surplus 
ሺߨ௕ െ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௕ െ ܮሻ ൌ ሺߨ௟ ൅ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௟ െ ܮሻ 
 ݐ ൌ 0 
 
Thus, assuming evenly matched bargaining skill, the two parties simply 
agree to what they (incorrectly) believe is the market loan agreement, namely 
the Neutral agreement.  The payoffs are ߨ௕ and ߨ௟ to the borrower and lender, 
respectively. 
 
2. State C:  Informed lender; uninformed borrower.  
 
In State C, the law firm representing the lender is informed, while the 
borrower’s law firm is uninformed.  Because the discrete term d is surplus-
increasing overall (albeit costly to the lender), the lender will reveal the term to 
the borrower and offer to include it in their agreement, in exchange for an 
appropriate transfer payment t.  However, the lender will not reveal that the 
borrower’s outside option is Borrower-Friendly (i.e., that it includes the discrete 
term d with t=0).  The parties will therefore negotiate as though the outside 
option is Neutral (i.e., no additional discrete terms and t=0).  The bargaining 
will lead to a transfer payment from the borrower to the lender, since the 
borrower benefits more from the discrete term: 
 
Borrower's surplus = Lender's surplus 
ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௕ െ ܮሻ ൌ ሺߨ௟ െ ݕ ൅ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௟ െ ܮሻ ݔ ൅ ݕ ൌ 2ݐ 
ݐ ൌ 0.5ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻ 
 
The associated payoffs are  ߨ௕ ൅ 0.5ሺݔ െ ݕሻ to the borrower and ߨ௟ ൅
0.5ሺݔ െ ݕሻ to the lender, respectively. 
 
3. State D:  Both parties informed. 
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In State D, both law firms are informed: they are aware of the discrete 
term and aware that the outside option is Borrower-Friendly.  They always find it 
optimal to negotiate an efficient agreement—that is, one in which the discrete 
term is included.  (Even if the lender had all the bargaining power, it would 
include the discrete term in exchange for additional payment of ݐ ൌ ሺݔ െ ݕሻ.)  
The negotiated value of t is determined by the parties’ outside options: the 
losses L from breaking off negotiations and the payoffs ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔሻ and ሺߨ௟ െ
ݕሻ, respectively, that the parties expect to earn if they negotiate with other 
parties: 
 
Borrower's surplus = Lender's surplus 
ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ ܮሻ ൌ ሺߨ௟ െ ݕ ൅ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௟ െ ݕ െ ܮሻ 
  ݐ ൌ 0 
 
The associated payoffs are ߨ௕ ൅ ݔ to the borrower and ߨ௟ െ ݕ to the lender, 
respectively. Thus, if the lender is informed, the borrower improves its payoff 
by also becoming informed (moving from State C to State D). 
 
4. State B:  Informed borrower; uninformed lender.  
 
In State B, the borrower’s law firm is informed but the lender’s is not. The 
borrower’s firm asserts that the market loan agreement is the Borrower-Friendly 
agreement. To make this self-serving claim credible, however, the borrower 
must signal through costly delay in the negotiations (Admati and Perry, 1987). 
Suppose that the lender will believe the claim after the borrower has rejected n 
offers made by the lender, and had n offers of its own rejected.  Thus, after 2n 
rejections, the parties will agree to the Borrower-Friendly agreement (the discrete 
term and t = 0).  To make the claim credible, n must be sufficiently high that a 
non-credible party is worse off for having rejected that many offers. Thus, n 
must be such that it would be unprofitable to wait 2n periods if the true 
market loan agreement were actually the Neutral agreement (no discrete term 
and t=0). 
 
If instead the market loan agreement were the Neutral agreement, the 
parties would negotiate a loan agreement that nonetheless included the discrete 
term d (since it is surplus-increasing overall and the borrower is aware of it) 
but that set t to reflect that the borrower’s and the lender’s respective outside 
options did not include the discrete term.  The resulting deal would be: 
 
Borrower's surplus = Lender's surplus 
ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௕ െ ܮሻ ൌ ሺߨ௟ െ ݕ ൅ ݐሻ െ ሺߨ௟ െ ܮሻ ݔ ൅ ݕ ൌ 2ݐ 
ݐ ൌ 0.5ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻ 
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Revealing the new term to the lender in this case would therefore earn the 
borrower an additional x, but also cost it ݐ ൌ 0.5ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻ. This is referred to 
hereafter as the “Default” Agreement. 
 
Instead, the borrower wishes to signal that the market loan agreement is 
the Borrower-Friendly agreement.  To constitute a credible signal, n must be such 
that the payoff to a borrower sending a false Borrower-Friendly signal through 2n 
offers is less than if the borrower simply accepts the Default agreement from 
the outset: 
 
Payoff to sending false Borrower-Friendly signal through 2n offers    
<   Payoff to accepting Default 
 
൮
Payoff if
negotiations
continue through
2n rejections
൲ ൅൮
Payoff if
negotiations
break down before
2n rejections
൲< Payoff to accepting Default 
 
ߜଶ௡ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻሺߨ௕ െ ܮሻ ൏ ߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ 0.5ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻ 
 
݊ ൐ ሾlnሺܮ ൅ 0.5ሺݔ െ ݕሻሻ െ ln	ሺܮ ൅ ݔሻሿ2ln	ሺߜሻ  
 
Thus, there is some n for which non-credible borrowers are screened out.  
If we choose the smallest value of n for which the inequality holds for a non-
credible borrower, then the inequality will not hold for an informed borrower 
signaling credibly.  In that case, if the market agreement is truly the Borrower-
Friendly agreement, then n is such that: 
 
Payoff to sending true Borrower-Friendly signal through 2n offers    
>   Payoff to accepting Default 
 
൮
Payoff if
negotiations
continue through
2n rejections
൲൅ ൮
Payoff if
negotiations
break down before
2n rejections
൲൐ Payoff to accepting Default 
 
ߜଶ௡ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ ܮሻ ൐ ߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ 0.5ሺݔ ൅ ݕሻ 
 
ߜଶ௡ሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻሺߨ௕ ൅ ݔ െ ܮሻ ൐ ߨ௕ ൅ 0.5ሺݔ െ ݕሻ (1) 
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Thus, in State B (in which an informed borrower faces an uninformed 
lender), the borrower’s payoff—the left side of inequality (1)—is strictly 
greater than the borrower’s payoff in State C (an uninformed borrower facing 
an informed lender)—the right side of inequality (1). The borrower’s payoff 
has also increased relative to State A in which both parties uninformed: it has 
increased from ߨ௕ to something aboveሺߨ௕ ൅ 0.5ሺݔ െ ݕሻሻ, which is greater.  
 
Separately, the lender’s payoff increases when moving from State B to D.  
The lender’s payoff in State B is ߜଶ௡ሺߨ௟ െ ݕሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻሺߨ௟ െ ݕ െ ܮሻ. That 
is, the lender will accept a payoff of ሺߨ௟ െ ݕሻ after signaling, but there is some 
risk that the negotiations break down during the credible signaling phase. If 
the negotiations break down, the lender returns to the market, incurs loss L, 
and learns that the market terms are ሺߨ௟ െ ݕሻ.  The lender’s payoff in State D 
is ሺߨ௟ െ ݕሻ, which is greater than in State B, because the lender avoids the 
risks of the signaling process.  Formally: 
 
Lender's payoff in B ൌ ߜଶ௡ሺߨ௟ െ ݕሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻሺߨ௟ െ ݕ െ ܮሻ 
 
ൌ ߨ௟ െ ݕ െ ܮሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻ 
 
൏ ߨ௟ െ ݕ 
 
because ሺ1 െ ߜଶ௡ሻ ൐ 0, given that 0 ൏ ߜ ൏ 1. 
 
Fig. 2.  Payoffs at Stage 2, if the market terms have shifted in favor of 
borrowers, and there is a surplus-increasing discrete term.10 
 
                                                 
10 In each cell, the top entry represents the payoff to the lender, while the bottom entry 
represents the payoff to the borrower. 
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Stage 0 decision: In Stage 0, the parties must choose whether to hire an 
informed law firm or an uninformed law firm. They choose based on the 
probability that market terms have shifted in favor of one party or the other, 
and the probability that surplus-enhancing discrete terms exist. 
In the scenario summarized in Figure 2, in which the market terms are 
favorable to borrowers, there is a strict ordering of preferences: borrowers prefer 
B to A, and D to C; and lenders prefer C to A, and D to B.  
By a parallel argument, if the market terms had instead shifted in favor of 
lenders, and a surplus-enhancing discrete term existed, the identical preference 
ranking of states would hold. In this case, the lender would credibly signal to 
the borrower in state C. In state B, the borrower would inform the lender of 
the discrete term, but not of the market shift, and the surplus would be split. 
State D would be identical. 
The remaining case to be analyzed is where the market terms have shifted 
in favor of one party, but no new surplus-increasing discrete terms have 
appeared. (This case is easily derived from the prior calculations: it is the case 
in which x=y.) In that case, the informed party dealing with an uninformed 
party will credibly signal when terms have shifted in their favor, and otherwise 
will remain silent.  If terms have shifted in favor of borrowers, this means that 
A and C are identical in terms of payoffs to both parties (before considering 
legal costs). In B, the borrower engages in costly signaling that terms have 
shifted in borrowers’ favor; the result is payoffs similar to D, minus the costs 
of signaling, which in this case is the increased risk of a breakdown in 
negotiations. Thus, the borrower prefers B to A and D to C, while the lender 
prefers D to B. It follows that D is the only equilibrium.   
Finally, if no market shifts in terms have occurred, and no discrete terms 
have arisen, the payoff to all states is identical (before considering legal costs). 
 
In Stage 0, the firm considers that all of these scenarios arise with some 
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positive probability. As a consequence, so long as ε (the additional cost of 
informed law firms) is small enough, outcome D is the only Nash equilibrium.  
If the parties were at A, the borrower would deviate to B, as it is preferable in 
expectation, from which the lender would deviate to D.  If the parties were at 
C, the borrower would deviate to D.  Thus, so long as ε is small enough, both 
parties will select informed law firms. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The market for law firms advising on large corporate transactions is highly 
concentrated, although the firms with the largest market shares vary by 
transaction type.  There are many reasons why corporate clients might engage 
law firms with significant market share for their transactions.  First, law firms 
that advise on a high volume of transactions can develop expertise relevant to 
the ultimate transactional outcome. They may become experts at structuring 
transactions and devising transaction terms to minimize information and 
transaction costs (Gilson, 1984); optimizing regulatory costs (Schwarcz, 2007); 
speed and certainty of execution; negotiating strategy, and so forth.  Second, 
high-market-share law firms may provide reputational advantages to 
transactional clients, providing a certification function for transaction parties 
similar to auditors (Kraakman, 1986). 
This paper describes an additional advantage to a law firm’s sizable market 
share: such firms have privileged access to the terms of recent transactions and 
expertise in haggling over them. This expertise in market information ensures 
that clients are aware of the full set of value-increasing terms for their 
transaction, and enables them to better determine expected payoffs and 
outside options for the complex non-price terms in major corporate 
transactions. Assuming a particular transaction type for which (1) the price 
term is set prior to the negotiation of non-price terms, (2) the non-price terms 
remain private for some period of time following agreement, and (3) the non-
price terms may temporarily shift in favor of one side without being reflected 
in the (public) price term, the model demonstrates that both counterparties to 
the transaction will maximize their expected transaction surplus by engaging a 
law firm with market information about transaction terms. Thus, elite law 
firms’ role in corporate transactions may extend beyond drafting and even 
innovating new terms to assisting with the pricing of terms. 
The notion that law firms may act as informational intermediaries in 
corporate transactions has gained broad acceptance over the last few decades 
(Gilson and Kraakman, 1984). Thus far, however, efforts to identify precisely 
what types of information law firms can acquire, and how such information 
can improve bargaining outcomes under different negotiating conditions, have 
been relatively limited. Future research in this area could be devoted to 
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determining the relative weight of elite firms’ various roles in the profits 
generated from corporate transactions. 
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